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1. Introduction 
 Our not so distant memory, of the merger boom of this millennium, recorded the 
value of worldwide mergers sky-rocketing to an all-time high nearly half of which was 
accounted by cross-border mergers1. While the current global crises have dampened this 
trend, there is a growing consensus2 that “a new wave” of cross-border mergers will be 
triggered by the imminent exit of public funds from ailing industries in the immediate 
aftermath of the crises3. With this backdrop, in this paper, we extend4 the work of Braid 
(2008) to demonstrate the effect of a cross-border merger between upstream firms on the 
equilibrium locations of downstream firms selling different varieties of a product. 
2. Model and Propositions 
Consider a vertically related5 industry. Let there be two upstream firms, M at home 
and *M in a foreign country, producing an intermediate good. Let there be two 
downstream firms, R at home and *R in the foreign country, who transform (on a one-to-
one basis) the intermediate good into the differentiated final goods and sell to consumers 
distributed uniformly with unit density on a uni-dimensional (linear) market interval with 
support [0, 1]. The downstream firms R  and *R  are located at x and y, respectively, on 
this interval. R  sells products U and W, and *R  sells products V and W:  a fraction c of 
consumers want to buy product U; a fraction c of consumers want to buy product V; and 
a fraction b of consumers want to buy product W.6 Transportation costs are td, where t is 
a constant and d is distance shipped. There is a maximum reservation price, denoted by k, 
that consumers (located in a third country) are willing to pay which is sufficiently large 
so that it comes into play only for product varieties where there is no competition 
between the two firms.  
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The game is played in three stages, with perfect monitoring i.e. all past actions 
become common knowledge at the end of each stage. In the first stage, M  and *M make 
a take-it-or-leave-it two-part tariﬀ oﬀer to R  and *R respectively: M ’s oﬀer takes the 
form  Fw,  and *M ’s oﬀer takes the form  ** , Fw  where ()w  is the marginal wholesale 
price and ()F  is the fixed fee extracted by an upstream firm from the downstream firm in 
each country. At the same time, R  and *R simultaneously choose their locations in the 
retail market. In the second stage, R  and *R simultaneously decide whether or not to 
accept or decline a contract. If ()R  decides to accept a contract offered, the fixed fee 
( ()F ) is collected by ()M  at this stage. In the third stage, R  and *R engage in spatial 
price discrimination. In the final stage, quantities are demanded by consumers from the 
upstream firms at which time the wholesale price has to be paid for each unit that is 
ordered and then sold in the retail market to consumers. 
 As usual, the game is solved by backward induction. We can then make a comparison 
between the pre-merger and post-merger (where the upstream firms merge across 
borders) equilibria with spatial price discrimination. For expositional convenience, let 
)(4 cb
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 In the pre-merger autarkic equilibrium, each upstream firm will charge a wholesale 
price ()w  and a fixed fee ()F that extracts all of the profits from each downstream firm. 
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The profits of *R , from selling varieties V and W, are  
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Due to the symmetric structure of the game, *~ www  . 
Solving the first order conditions for profit-maximization, we obtain 
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                          Figure 1. Downstream Location under Autarky 
 In the pre-merger free-trade equilibrium, the home and the foreign manufacturers of 
the intermediate good can each make only zero profits on its contract notwithstanding the 
vertical structure:    0,0, ()() Fw . The intuition lies in the classic Bertrand model: under 
free trade, each upstream firm can always slightly undercut any contract which allows its 
rival to make a positive profit since upstream firms produce a homogeneous intermediate 
good and compete in (nonlinear) prices. 
The profits of R , from selling varieties U and W, are  
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The profits of *R , from selling varieties V and W, are  
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Solving the first order conditions for profit-maximization, we obtain 
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    Figure 2. Downstream Location under Free Trade before Merger Upstream 
This leads to our second proposition.7 
Proposition II. Under free trade, the pre-merger Nash equilibrium locations of the two 
downstream firms, in a vertically related industry, is 

  r
2
1 . 
 If  M  and *M merge, under free trade, the merged upstream firm ( M
~ ) will charge a 
uniform wholesale price w~  and a fixed fee F~ that extracts all of the profits from each 
downstream firm. The profits of R , from selling varieties U and W, are  
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Solving the first order conditions for profit-maximization, we obtain 
0 1 ½ 
 
 
 
    Social Optimum 
R  R
*  
         r                      r 
Cross-border Merger, Vertical Structure, and Spatial Competition 
5 
(9)             







bccb
cbwbbcbc
bccb
cbwbbcbcyx
324
~834,
324
~44),( 22
22
22
22
 
 
                          



 cb
wb
24
~                                                            



 cb
wb
24
~  
 
      Figure 3. Downstream Location under Free Trade after Merger Upstream 
This leads to our final proposition. 8 
Proposition III. The Nash equilibrium locations of the two downstream firms, in a 
vertically related industry, move to   
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upstream. 9 
3. Conclusion 
 
 Our analysis is a natural follow up of continued efforts to assess the consequences of 
cross-border mergers in industries with a vertical structure10. Absent free trade, in a 
vertically related industry, the downstream firms will not choose the social optimum 
under spatial price discrimination when none of the downstream firms produce all the 
varieties that consumers demand. We show that free trade will induce the downstream 
firms to gravitate toward the social optimum but an upstream merger across borders, 
under free trade, will pull the downstream firms away from the social optimum back to 
their autarkic positions. 
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Endnotes 
                                                          
1 See Neary (2007) and Beladi et al. (2010b). Neary (2007) constructed the first general equilibrium model of cross-
border mergers where he showed how trade liberalization can trigger international merger waves through bilateral 
mergers in which it is profitable for low-cost firms to buy out higher-cost foreign rivals. Beladi et al. (2010b) present a 
theoretical model to capture the role of the vertical structure, of an oligopolistic industry, in the incentives for and 
implications of cross-border horizontal mergers. 
2 Source: World Investment Prospects Survey (WIPS) 2009–2011. 
3  See Klomp (2010). 
4 Beladi et al. (2008) extended Braid (2008) to study the relationship between a company’s vertical structure and its 
choice of location under conditions of spatial price discrimination in an industry where none of the downstream firms 
produce all varieties demanded by consumers. This was extended to a sequential game in Beladi et al. (2010a) which 
builds on the works of Maskin and Riley (1984) and Arozamena and Weinschelbaum (2009). 
5 See Amador and Cabral (2009). 
6 One can contemplate, following Braid (2007), an equivalent scenario where firm 1 sells product variety G, and firm 2 
sells product variety H: a fraction c of consumers wants to buy only variety G; a fraction c of consumers wants to buy 
only variety H; and a fraction b of consumers is indifferent between varieties G and H. If each firm cannot price 
discriminate at each location between the different types of consumers who find its own variety desirable, then it might 
be possible to assume mixed price strategies, but unlike Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), who have a single mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium in mill prices for any given set of firm locations, there would be a different mixed-strategy 
Nash equilibrium in delivered prices at each consumer location for any given set of firm locations. We maintain that 
there is spatial price discrimination for product W of the sort first examined in Hoover (1937) and Lerner and Singer 
(1937), in which there is a Nash equilibrium in delivered price schedules.   
7 This replicates Braid’s (2008) key proposition that the equilibrium locations of the products of the two downstream 
firms are partially centralized to the socially optimal if neither of the downstream firms can produce all varieties 
demanded. 
8 Our results are likely to have important implications for a firm’s inter-temporal choice of entry mode. See, for 
instance, Haller (2009), Lahiri (2009), Kurata et al. (2009) and Raff et al. (2009).  
9 Analogous to Beladi et al. (2008), notwithstanding the vertical structure of the market, the downstream firms gravitate 
toward the social optimum if  0b  (i.e. when, in the absence of any demand for W, the downstream firms are reduced 
to spatial-price-discriminating monopolists choosing uniform delivered prices). This replicates the equilibrium one 
would expect, á la Hotelling (1929), in the market for a homogeneous product where the (mill) prices of the two firms 
are exogenous and equal, and consumers pay travel costs. 
10 See Lafontaine and Slade (2007) for an insightful review of the contributions relevant to the related literature. 
